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Abstract
The ethics of forensic professionalism is often couched in terms of competing individual and societal values. 
Indeed, the welfare of individuals is often secondary to the requirements of society, especially given the public 
nature of courts of law, forensic hospitals, jails, and prisons. We explore the weaknesses of this dichotomous 
approach to forensic ethics, offering an analysis of Psychology’s historical narrative especially relevant to the 
national security and correctional settings. We contend that a richer, more robust ethical analysis is available 
if practitioners consider the multiple perspectives in the forensic encounter, and acknowledge the multiple 
influences of personal, professional, and social values. The setting, context, or role is not sufficient to deter-
mine the ethics of forensic practice.  
The public forum—the root of the term “forensic”—provides a setting where individ-
ual welfare and social justice strain against each other. Professionals who work in public 
fora (i.e., forensic practitioners), labor in settings like courtrooms, correctional facilities, 
and national security agencies that raise one of the most painful dilemmas in professional 
ethics: whether their primary duty is to the legal aspects of their work or to the clinical 
and scientific standards they employ. The law determines many of the elements critical to 
forensic work, while the scientific and clinical professions socialize, train, and introduce 
practitioners to their craft. The public forum consequently provides the setting where 
these ethical and professional tensions play out. Nowhere is this tension borne out more 
poignantly than in questions of community security, namely in assessing individuals who 
may present a danger to those around them. Individuals committed or incarcerated, for 
example, as a danger to commit suicide, to terrorize, assault, assassinate, rape, or set fires 
raise harrowing concerns for their safety and the safety of families, neighbors, and chil-
dren. Such individuals bear enormous scrutiny as society determines whether they can 
re-enter the community and face high thresholds for that re-entry. In such cases it is al-
most a matter of faith that legal, and indeed community, standards will trump other con-
siderations. After all, the decisions are often made in courtrooms—presided over by pro-
fessionals with legal, not clinical, training. 
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Yet, a social contract is in place that requires special protections for those in vulnerable 
positions. Prisoners are protected by Supreme Court rulings that require avoiding “delib-
erate indifference” to their health (Estelle v. Gamble 429 U.S. 97, 1976); patients interact-
ing with clinical professionals are afforded informed consent, and accused criminals re-
quire Miranda warnings and access to counsel. There are also professional standards for 
psychologists, psychiatrists, nurses, social workers, and scientists that require attention to 
the rights of individual evaluees (Candilis, Weinstock, & Martinez, 2007). 
It may be clear that it is not sufficient for one set of values to trump another. The prin-
ciples guiding community safety and law come up against not only the principles sup-
porting individual rights and care but also the expectations of communities and organi-
zations. The public setting of the courtroom invites consideration of multiple perspectives 
in an adversarial framework called imperfect procedural justice (Rawls, 1971). Recogniz-
ing that Truth is an ideal in human affairs, it is procedure that matters most of all, so that 
if a fair process is followed, Truth can be closely approximated even if it is not attained. 
It may be tempting to consider an equal balance between justice and welfare as a solu-
tion to the tensions of forensic practice. In fact a wide-spread principlist model urges rec-
ognition of competing prima facie principles of beneficence, non-maleficence, justice, and 
autonomy (Beauchamp & Childress, 2001). The principles are equal at first look (prima fa-
cie), but can be weighed against each other by following certain ethical rules. 
The difficulty has been that ethics and professionalism have never been about princi-
ples alone (Arras, 1997). Context matters, so that the narrative of those involved in the fo-
rensic encounter—evaluee, evaluator, victim, witnesses, community—is part of the foren-
sic and ethical analysis. In forensic reports, collateral sources are used to paint a complete 
picture of events. School and hospital records contribute to analysis and outcome. The 
evolving thinking of the profession colors the result as well. Context comes from the full 
story or narrative and allows a deeper understanding of the intentions and motives of ac-
tors in the human drama. 
This is a language that arises from the new perspective of narrative ethics, a perspec-
tive that offers a powerful new tool for exploring the conflict and tension of forensic cases. 
For deciding which ethic comes first—which duty is paramount—narrative provides the 
beginnings of a richer and more robust discussion of forensic professionalism. 
We will follow the historical narrative of psychology, at times comparing it to psychia-
try, to tease out the primary influences on forensic practice, and offer a unified model that 
goes beyond the role-based ethics of either justice or welfare. We will underscore the pro-
fession’s involvement in military and security affairs to develop the point that forensic 
practice requires a unified, integrated, and robust vision of professional ethics. 
Historical context:  The roots of psychology 
Psychology developed out of the traditions of moral philosophy. It developed in the 
19th century as an experimental science attempting to quantify and measure ideas that 
had fascinated philosophers for centuries: ideas like consciousness, sensation, and per-
ception (Grisso, 1993). Indeed, experimental psychologists made up the American Psy-
chological Association (APA) in its early years. However, during the early part of the 20th 
century, some psychologists began applying psychology outside the laboratory (see e.g., 
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Grisso, 2001; and http://www.apa.org/about/apa/archives/apa-history.aspx). 
During World War II, for example, psychologists developed group tests for military 
examiners to determine quickly the draft eligibility of young men, and provided mental 
health services to hospitalized soldiers upon their return home (Fisher, 2003). Thus, “clin-
ical” psychology—the application of basic psychology to evaluating and treating peo-
ple—was born (Grisso, 2001). Clinical psychology experienced considerable growth dur-
ing and after World War II. 
In response to the advent of clinical psychology, the APA broadened its scope after 
the World War, from the experimental science of psychology to the promotion of hu-
man welfare (e.g., clinical applications). This included efforts well known today, from the 
treatment of families and individuals to consultations in school systems and workplaces. 
Today, APA remains the largest scientific and professional organization representing 
psychology in the United States. In keeping to its roots, it continues to serve both experi-
mental and applied fields. 
Development of an ethics code in psychology 
In response to the increased professional activity and public visibility of psychologists 
during and after World War II, psychology developed a code of ethics. In 1947, APA ap-
pointed a Committee on Ethical Standards for Psychologists to develop a code that was to 
guide both experimental and applied psychologists and be applicable across diverse roles 
and contexts (Fisher, 2003). One of the members of the original committee wrote about 
their task, “In a field so complex, where individual and social values are yet but ill de-
fined, the desire to play fairly must be given direction and consistency by some rules of 
the game” (Hobbs, 1948, p. 81). 
In recognizing both individual and social values, the committee gathered more than 
1,000 case examples of ethical problems encountered by psychologists in their daily work 
(Fisher, 2003). These cases ranged from psychologists’ relationships with and responsibil-
ities to others, to confrontations between academic freedom and McCarthyism, and di-
lemmas faced by psychologists working in industry (Fisher, 2003). The organization con-
sequently drafted its code based on the ethical issues in these case examples. In a process 
that would anticipate future codes in other professions, the authors included both aspira-
tional standards (i.e., ideal standards of conduct towards which all psychologists should 
strive) as well as professional values and practical techniques for identifying and resolv-
ing moral problems (Fisher, 2003). After revisions and critiques from the membership, 
APA’s first code of ethics was published in 1953. 
The APA ethics code has undergone nine revisions since that time, but it remains ap-
plicable to all brands of psychologists today—no matter the setting in which psycholo-
gists work or the type of work they do. There are both enforceable rules (e.g., minimum 
standards of conduct for which violations have consequences) and aspirational principles 
in the current ethics code. In an attempt to maintain a realistic regulatory stance, the APA 
expects that enforceable standards are only enforceable for APA members, but aspira-
tional principles apply to all psychologists regardless of membership in the APA. 
For our purposes in determining the ethics of forensic practice, it is the aspirational 
principles that are most relevant. They comprise five broad goals from the principlist 
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model: Beneficence and Nonmaleficence (i.e., striving to do good and do no harm), Fidelity 
and responsibility (i.e., meeting responsibilities, avoiding conflicts, maintaining trustwor-
thiness), Integrity (i.e., maintaining honest communications and accuracy), Justice (i.e., 
striving to ensure all people have fair and equitable access to and benefit from scientific 
knowledge), and Respect for people’s rights and dignity (i.e., taking precautions to safeguard 
individuals’ rights and welfare, and striving to be aware of and eliminate the effects of 
prejudice). The cardinal principles of professional ethics are recognizable here, as is the 
idea that ethics apply across all settings and contexts. 
Psychology’s approach to dual agency 
Over time, the most parsimonious approach to professional ethics has been to apply 
principles within a specific role or to see practitioners as agents of a specific institution 
(Bradley, 1988). Professionals may act as forensic experts in one setting but as citizens and 
parents in others. They may be agents of a court, a hospital, a school committee, or a fam-
ily at different times. They do not act as parents when they serve as courtroom experts; they 
wear different “hats” depending on the role or context. The tension arises when the princi-
ples guiding one role come up against the principles of another. This is the problem of dual 
agency—a problem that consequently invites input from more than two perspectives. 
A dual agent, then, is a person or company representing both parties to a transaction 
(e.g., a real estate agent representing both buyer and seller). This situation may lead to a 
conflict of interest, and—for real estate agents at least—is illegal in many states. Psychol-
ogists usually serve in a single capacity by applying psychological knowledge to individ-
ual cases; that is, the client is the individual receiving the service. However, psychologists 
represent distinct values derived from many sources: their profession, upbringing, educa-
tion, and experience, so they may become involved in a further conflict because third par-
ties are interested in the outcome of their work. The third parties may be interested in the 
result for a variety of reasons that do not involve an evaluative, diagnostic, or treatment 
relationship with the person to whom services are provided. 
Courts, for example, may wish to know whether a person has a mental illness and what 
the effects of the illness might be on that person’s behavior. Police departments may wish 
to know whether the officers they intend to hire are psychologically stable. Disability insur-
ers may wish to know whether patients are legitimately ill or whether they are malingering. 
Governments may want to know whether a person poses a legitimate threat to the safety 
and security of the state, and so forth. In these cases, it is not clear who the client is. That is, 
without clarification of this question, the person being evaluated or treated may think s/he 
is the client, while the third party paying the bill may think the same. 
Without clarification of this agency question—“Who is the client?”—and recognition 
of the multiple influences on the answer, each one of the five aspirational principles of 
the psychologist’s code could be violated. Let us say, for example, that a judge wants to 
know whether Jimmy Doe, a defendant accused of an attempted assassination, is men-
tally ill. Dr. Smith, a psychologist, accepts the referral and conducts a diagnostic evalua-
tion. Mr. Doe appreciates receiving the diagnostic workup and very much wants help, so 
he divulges a great deal of private information. He tells Dr. Smith about his father sexu-
ally abusing him when he was a child; he talks about his guilt over sexually abusing chil-
dren in his neighborhood; and he reports current thoughts of killing himself.  
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If Dr. Smith did not make the purpose of the evaluation thoroughly clear to Mr. Doe 
(and remind him several times), inform him how the information would be used, and make 
clear that the role of the evaluator was not that of a treating professional, there is a high like-
lihood of harms unrelated to the purposes of the evaluation. These harms include: 
• harm to Mr. Doe (i.e., by disclosing several new crimes) in violation of beneficence and 
nonmaleficence; 
• conflicting expectations of Dr. Smith by the two parties, a situation in which one of 
the parties is bound to have their expectations violated, contravening fidelity and 
responsibility; 
• damage to Dr. Smith’s integrity; he has not communicated honestly about his role or the 
purpose of the evaluation with one or perhaps both of the parties; 
• ignoring Mr. Doe’s clinical needs: It is not clear whether Dr. Smith should take action to 
connect Mr. Doe with the treatment services he clearly needs, which is perhaps in vio-
lation of beneficence and possibly fairness, the justice principle; 
• presenting irrelevant and inflammatory information in court: If Dr. Smith were to write 
or testify about Mr. Doe’s experience of sexual abuse at the hands of his father, par-
ticularly if it was not relevant to the purposes of the evaluation, it would violate the 
principle of respect for persons. 
The APA ethics code includes specific standards to help psychologists navigate these 
agency problems. For example, APA Standard 3.10 “Informed Consent” protects the self-
governance and privacy rights of those with whom psychologists work by requiring psy-
chologists to “obtain the informed consent of the individual or individuals using language 
that is reasonably understandable to that person or persons…” Informed consent proce-
dures mandate that psychologists describe the nature and purpose of the service as well as 
the limits of confidentiality. Specific guidance is provided for informed consent with per-
sons who are legally incapable of giving informed consent, as well as the special exceptions 
to informed consent when psychological services are court-ordered or otherwise mandated. 
In addition, there are several standards to guide psychologists towards principled be-
havior in the light of the special ethical challenges associated with serving in a dual role. 
For example, APA Standard 3.07 “Third-Party Requests for Services” makes clear the re-
quirement of explicitly identifying “Who is the client?” Psychologists must specifically 
identify the client to all individuals involved, clarify the nature and purpose of the service 
(including the non-treatment role of the psychologist), and the limits of confidentiality. 
As a final example, APA Standard 3.11 “Psychological Services Delivered To or Through 
Organizations” goes beyond the individual consent protections in standard 3.10 to apply to 
forensic evaluations, consulting, or other psychological services delivered to or through or-
ganizations. This standard builds on 3.07 and 3.10 by requiring psychologists to provide 
information to and obtain informed consent from the organization as well as individual 
evaluees. Psychologists must clarify the intended recipients of their services, which of the 
individuals are clients, the relationship the psychologist will have with each person and 
with the organization, and meet the other elements of informed consent as well. If the psy-
chologist will be prevented from providing feedback about the results to either the organi-
zation or the individual, the psychologist must make clear the obligations to all parties at 
the outset. The APA consequently identifies obligations to the profession in making clear 
the influence of multiple agents in otherwise classic dual agency cases. 
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Ethics in the context of national security 1 
Nowhere are the multiple influences on forensic professional ethics more salient than 
in discussions of national security. If the social structure that offers a foundation for pro-
fessional practice is threatened, professionals can easily be recruited to assess threats, pre-
dict outcomes, and to elicit information. This is precisely what occurred after the terror at-
tacks of September 11, 2001. Behavioral Science Consultation Teams (BSCT or “biscuit” 
teams) were famously developed to advise military interrogators after 9/11 (Candilis, 
2009; Lewis, 2005; Margulies, 2007). Psychologists and psychiatrists advised the military 
on the weaknesses of military detainees, and “stress positions,” “sleep deprivation,” and 
other terms entered the common parlance. Indeed, aggressive interrogation techniques 
became indistinguishable from outright torture. The historical narrative that preceded the 
notorious involvement of BSCT teams in national security provides the context for a dis-
cussion of the importance of professional ethics that acknowledge multiple perspectives 
in forensic work. We now turn to this historical narrative. 
In 1985, the APA and the American Psychiatric Association issued a joint statement 
condemning torture and supporting the UN Declaration and Convention Against Torture 
and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, the UN Principles of Med-
ical Ethics, as well as the joint Congressional Resolution opposing torture signed into law 
by President Reagan on October 4, 1984. In 1986, the APA Council of Representatives ap-
proved a Resolution Opposing Torture, in which APA noted that “psychological knowledge 
and techniques may be used to design and carry out torture” but that APA “condemns tor-
ture wherever it occurs.” This policy has since been reaffirmed by the APA several times. 
However, voices within the profession left room for practitioners to serve security in-
terests. In response to heated controversy regarding the appropriateness of involvement 
in military interrogations, the American Psychological, Psychiatric, and Medical Associa-
tions appointed special committees to explore the ethical aspects of involvement in mili-
tary interrogations (Behnke, 2006). By 2006, each organization had issued their respective 
position statements. The APA position was published in the “Psychological Ethics and Na-
tional Security” (PENS) Task Force report, which we briefly discuss first. We then compare 
and contrast the APA position with the concurrent American Psychiatric and Medical As-
sociation positions before discussing their continuing evolution over the past 7 years. 
The PENS Task Force report 
In 2005, the APA Task Force on PENS Task Force was established to address the con-
troversial role of psychology and psychologists in interrogations and give guidance to 
APA members about work in national security settings. 
The Task Force report was released on July 5, 2005 (see http://www.apa.org/news/
press/releases/2005/07/pens.aspx ) and was formally adopted by the APA Board of Di-
rectors as APA Policy. It affirmed the adequacy of the ethics code in addressing the ethi-
cal dimensions regarding psychologists’ involvement in interrogations and other national 
security-related activities. It concluded that the ethics code did not prohibit psychologists 
1. This information is drawn from a website documenting the “Timeline of APA Policies and Actions Related to 
Detainee Welfare and Professional Ethics in the Context of Interrogation and National Security”—available at 
http://www.apa.org/news/press/statements/interrogations.aspx      
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from serving in consultative roles to interrogation or information-gathering processes 
in national security settings. However, the report also found that psychologists have an 
“ethical obligation to be alert to and report any acts of torture or cruel or inhuman treat-
ment to appropriate authorities.”
In fact, the report specifically “rejected the contention that when acting in roles outside 
traditional health-service provider relationships psychologists are not acting in a profes-
sional capacity as psychologists and are therefore not bound by the APA ethics code.” 
Thus, the Task Force explicitly concluded that the APA ethics code applies to all psy-
chologists—regardless of their training, experience, work role, or whether they identified 
themselves as “psychologists,” “behavioral scientists,” or another term. 
The American Psychological, Psychiatric, and Medical Association positions 
on involvement in military interrogations 
In 2006, the director of the APA Ethics Office, Stephen Behnke, J.D., Ph.D., offered a 
comparison of the ethical foundations of the American Psychological, Psychiatric, and Med-
ical Associations’ positions. He concluded that the American Psychological and American 
Medical Association positions were quite similar, but that they were substantively different 
from the position of the American Psychiatric Association. What all three organizations had 
in common—and continue to have in common—is the ethical mandate that no psycholo-
gist, psychiatrist, or physician ever facilitate or permit torture or other inhumane treatment. 
Behnke noted that the APA and AMA ethical analyses both rested on balancing two 
obligations: obligations to protect individual human rights against obligations to protect 
third parties and the public. These obligations are derived from the principlist model as 
reflected in APA aspirational principles of beneficence/nonmaleficence and fidelity/re-
sponsibility, which address psychologists’ responsibilities to society. These are tied ex-
plicitly to using psychological knowledge to aid in the understanding of human behavior 
and in the prevention of harm (Behnke, 2006). In contrast, the American Psychiatric Asso-
ciation’s position emphasized protecting individual human rights by resting squarely on 
the “Do no harm” principle. Protecting society was secondary. 
These different approaches led the professional associations to reach different conclu-
sions. Although the APA concluded that psychologists could consult to interrogations 
for national security-related purposes under strict ethical guidance (e.g., never serving 
as a treater and interrogator at the same time, not being involved in coercive interroga-
tions, not using information from an individual’s medical chart to inform the interroga-
tive methods, reporting interrogations in which unethical behaviors occur), the American 
Psychiatric Association concluded that psychiatrists could not ethically consult to inter-
rogations at all, even if the interrogation were conducted to “identify other persons who 
have committed or may be planning to commit acts of violence” (Behnke, 2006). 
Controversies over prioritizing justice over individual welfare 
Finding the appropriate ethical balance between individual and society has continued 
to prove challenging for psychology and psychiatry and underscores the weakness of this 
dichotomous approach. Prioritizing one’s duty to the hiring organization (e.g., develop-
ing and monitoring interrogation techniques to extract information from enemy combat-
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ants) over one’s duty to protect individual human rights has proved especially controver-
sial in the last several years. This is because the PENS Report and the 2002 revision of the 
APA guidelines did not speak directly to the ethics of relative balancing. 
Without clear ethical guidance on the appropriate balance between societal and indi-
vidual rights, some psychologists and psychiatrists prioritized society’s needs over the 
rights of individuals. This work played out primarily in national security settings where 
the perceived need to protect society was so great. For example, one prominent psychia-
trist who advised government agencies observed that psychiatrists could legitimately de-
velop and monitor interrogation techniques because they acted in a role outside their tra-
ditional obligations (Phillips, 2005). This approach, known as “exceptionalism” where 
forensic professionals act under an exception to traditional ethical rules, made room for a 
different ethic when practitioners served security interests. Indeed, the APA itself noted 
professionals’ potentially constructive role in recognizing abuse or health concerns. 
In the mid-2000s, when the professional associations were initially considering the ap-
propriate ethical balance between individuals and society, many commentators felt that 
a mere balancing of interests could solve the problem of dual agency. Where there were 
tensions between professional values and organizational norms (whether federal, correc-
tional, or judicial), practitioners were urged to clarify conflicts, inform parties involved 
of their agency, and to seek resolution to the conflict (Allan, 2013). It seemed a sufficient 
course to address the tension of competing values. 
The danger, however, was in the creation of institutional or “artificial” persons (Wolgast, 
1992). Drawing on the philosophy of Thomas Hobbes, Elizabeth Wolgast was among those 
raising the alarm about individual responsibility in the face of organizational values. She ap-
plied the concept of “artificial,” “feigned,” or “fictional” persons to describe the moral vac-
uum of individuals speaking or acting on behalf of their institutions (Candilis et al., 2007). At 
a time when security interests were driving societal and professional norms, it was this dy-
namic that created a widening gap between professional values and organizational or soci-
etally driven goals. It ignored both personal and professional values as moderating influences. 
The historical narrative of the clinical and behavioral sciences raised yet another specter 
during the ascendancy of BSCT teams and behavioral consultation to the armed forces. The 
lessons of Nazi medicine and Soviet psychiatry could not be fully appreciated when excep-
tionalism pushed the behavioral sciences outside traditional clinical norms. The protections 
of individual rights and professional standards were weakened when there were special, 
attenuated rules for the treatment of individuals in the control of the state. The Department 
of Defense’s own regulations at this time confirmed that consulting professionals could be-
have in a manner “inconsistent with traditional medical ethics” (Keram, 2006). 
For forensic psychiatry, exceptionalism reached its zenith with the publication of a 
theory for forensic practice that was based in research ethics (Appelbaum, 1997). This 
approach to the work of forensic practitioners equated forensic practice with the stan-
dards of conducting clinical research. Research participants could not expect clinical care, 
but were protected by information disclosures and a clear description of the purpose of 
the research. For forensic practice, social values of truth and justice could therefore ap-
ply with more force as long as there were disclosures on the limits of confidentiality and 
a clear description of the purposes of the encounter. Indeed, forensic professionals could 
not be useful to society if they remained committed to ideals of beneficence: putting the 
patient first, following ideals of self-actualization and protection from harm. 
et h i C s  i n f o r e n s i C C o n s u ltat i o n     27
The response from other commentators was swift. Some recognized that truth and jus-
tice could not be served if other voices were not heard. The inequalities of society and the 
legal system were not addressed in simple agency conflicts (Candilis, Martinez, & Dord-
ing, 2001; Griffith, 1998). The narrative of vulnerable individuals and non-dominant cul-
tures before the bar was not equivalent to that of the dominant culture. There could be 
no justice in professional frameworks that did not address the unequal treatment of non-
dominant groups. Antiseptic balancing of truth and justice rang hollow when the narra-
tives of vulnerable populations and individuals were ignored (Candilis, 2009). 
For Michael Norko of Yale (2005) there was even more to forensic practice than truth-tell-
ing or principles of justice. In the move towards a more culturally sensitive practice, Norko 
saw norms of social discourse that relied on basic religious and philosophical systems. The 
biblical Golden Rule and Kant’s “treat others as you would be treated” identified a moral 
foundation of forensic practice based on compassion for the vulnerable individual. Drawn 
from a commonality of human experience and compassion for others, this approach re-
quired that the law and forensic practice be entrusted to those who understood this obliga-
tion between citizens. Otherwise, damage to both individuals and institutions would ensue. 
The weaknesses of exceptionalism and strict role theory in the work of forensic practitio-
ners were becoming evident. Setting the work of psychological and psychiatric consultants 
outside the traditional norms of practice created a speculative role outside the influences of 
the profession’s historical narrative, the protections of professional codes, and the presence 
of personal values. Such “artificial persons” had little moral foundation in a world that of-
fered multiple ethical influences on forensic professionals. Influences of upbringing, culture, 
community, training, and mentorship could somehow be submerged in a fanciful construct 
where the needs of an organization merely created an obligation to attenuate the damage. 
Evolving ethics and relative balancing of justice and individual welfare 
The controversy over the involvement of psychological consultants to military inter-
rogations was not clarified by the official APA position statement in the PENS Task Force 
report. In fact, the report left room for interpretation (i.e., permission to prioritize indi-
vidual’s rights over society’s rights, to balance individual and society rights equally, or to 
prioritize society’s rights over individual rights). This created more confusion and contro-
versy than existed before the official statements. 
Members of APA—and society at large—reacted strongly to the lack of clear guidance. 
In 2008, for example, members of APA worked without official APA oversight to initiate a 
special resolution to prohibit any psychologist from working in detainee settings in which 
international law or the U.S. Constitution was violated. Exceptions were allowed when 
the psychologist worked directly for the detainees or for an independent party to protect 
human rights, or to provide treatment to military personnel. The resolution went up for a 
special vote and was approved by the APA members shortly thereafter (see http://www.
apa.org/monitor/2008/11/interrogations.aspx). 
In 2010, as part of this evolving narrative and in recognition of the multiple sources of 
professional ethics (i.e., organizational, societal, personal), the APA ethics code was re-
vised to reflect the member-initiated resolution. Specifically, the revisions made clear that 
psychological consultants cannot prioritize society’s demands over individual human 
rights; that violating human rights is not acceptable under any circumstances—in no set-
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tings and in no consultation roles. Even now, there is a member-initiated task force draft-
ing a resolution to replace the PENS report with new guidelines and to reconcile policies 
related to psychologists’ involvement in national security settings. 
In making clear that individual human rights must never be violated by psychologists 
acting in any role, psychology’s position has come to resemble psychiatry’s more closely 
(i.e., that psychologists and psychiatrists may prioritize individual welfare over social 
justice or equally balance them, but they may not violate individual human rights to priv-
ilege social justice). Both professions continue to engage in an evolving discussion and 
each has moved in the direction of more nuanced ethical guidance for consultants. 
Robust professionalism: Integrating values 
For a theory of professional ethics to have meaning, it must be grounded in its roots 
and direction at the same time. The value of the historical narrative is not merely an ap-
peal to tradition, but a grounding in values that have developed and been tested over 
time. A robust professionalism consequently recognizes the contributions of the commu-
nity and core professions that privilege them. A profession with moral integrity—under-
stood here as a matter of wholeness or intactness—must continually incorporate commu-
nity, professional, and even personal values to have standing among the individuals and 
communities that it serves. We honor the views of scholars like Ciccone and Clements 
(2001), who recognize the interplay of multiple systems in forensic work, and of Radden 
(2001),who identifies role-related and general obligations nested within each other. Ward 
(2013) as well, recognizes the importance of moral relationships in moving forensic ethics 
beyond a mere discussion of role conflicts. Sacrificing elements of professional ethics to 
the setting in which professionals practice weakens the legitimacy of the work and loos-
ens it from its moral moorings. Exceptionalism has no place when multiple perspectives 
enrich the analysis. 
At the same time, an evolution of values is permitted so that discussions of security 
over welfare remain part of the developing narrative. It is not sufficient to close debate 
in the arena of national security, or corrections for that matter, when alternative perspec-
tives still influence the discussion so strongly. Only through recognition of the multiple 
values influencing forensic practice can a truly robust professional ethic exist. 
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